The OCC's final GENIUS Act rule sets a 5% cash floor and a 40% cap on any one counterparty. The Fed's open proposal uses neither figure, and its comment window runs until November 30. Issuers now face two sets of reserve rules that share a redemption deadline and differ on almost everything else. Ask a stablecoin issuer what its reserves must look like in 2027, and the honest answer is now: it depends which regulator you ask. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) gave its answer on October 21, the final rule implementing the GENIUS Act . Our October 19 piece on staggered agency filings expected that rule "before the end of October," and it came two days later. The rule sets specific numbers: at least 5% of reserves in demand deposits or similar instant-access funds, and no more than 40% of reserves with a single counterparty. The Federal Reserve's answer is still a proposal. Its GENIUS Act rulemaking remains open for comment until November 30, and it contains neither of those numbers. Until the Fed finalizes its rule, any company planning to issue under both agencies' rules, or deciding which one to apply to, is working with one fixed set of numbers and one open-ended set of principles. What The OCC Locked In On October 21 The OCC's final rule was published in the Federal Register on October 23 and takes effect on January 18, 2027, the same day as the GENIUS Act itself. Comptroller Jonathan V. Gould called it "a clear, practical framework for payment stablecoin innovation, with strong standards for reserve backing, redemption, and risk management." The reserve rules are looser than the March proposal in several places: Cash floor: at least 5% of reserve assets must sit in demand deposits, insured shares or Federal Reserve Bank balances. The proposal asked for 10%. Counterparty cap: no more than 40% of reserves with one counterparty. Exposures to the U.S. government, qualifying custodians and centrally cleared repo are exempt. Dropped requirements: the proposed weekly liquidity limits and a 20-day weighted-average-maturity requirement were removed. Excess reserves: issuers can now withdraw them at any time after due diligence, instead of on a monthly schedule. The OCC also removed the rebuttable presumption that some affiliate yield arrangements break the GENIUS Act's ban on paying interest, though it kept its broader anti-evasion powers. The agency received about 328 comments. For existing issuers, the timeline is short. Under OCC Bulletin 2026-51 , firms already operating in the United States that file a "substantially complete" application by January 18 can generally expect a waiver of the prior-approval requirement. Where The Fed's Open Proposal Stands The Fed released its two proposals on September 24 . They were published in the Federal Register on September 29 under Docket No. R-1899, and comments are due November 30. The main requirements proposal would require Board-supervised issuers to "fully back their stablecoins with certain permissible reserve assets". The reserves' fair value would have to equal or exceed the stablecoins' outstanding value at all times. Permissible assets include: coins and currency Federal Reserve Bank balances eligible deposits short-dated Treasuries and related repurchase agreements funds that hold only those assets On diversification, however, the Fed sets no numbers. Reserves must be "sufficiently diverse" to keep one-to-one backing at all times, and issuers must manage concentration in uninsured deposits and repo counterparties. The Board says it generally expects reserves to be mostly Treasuries, but it sets no cash floor and no counterparty percentage. Same Two-Day Clock, Different Escape Hatches Redemption is where the two agencies agree most closely. Both define timely redemption as no later than two business days after a request. The difference lies in what happens under stress. The OCC's final rule: An issuer must notify the OCC within 24 hours if redemption requests exceed 10% of outstanding issuance in a single 24-hour period. The issuer may then ask for an extension, which the OCC can grant or refuse. The proposed automatic extension to seven calendar days is gone, after commenters warned it could deepen a run. The Fed's proposal: It has no 10% trigger. The Board may extend the deadline at its discretion for safety-and-soundness, financial-stability or public-interest reasons. Separate safe harbours cover delays caused by anti-money-laundering and sanctions reviews, or by events outside the issuer's control. The FDIC, in its own proposal , uses a third approach: issuers would report on their own when redemption requests exceed 10% of issuance within 24 hours. The Reserve Floors Side By Side The clearest conflict is not about how much cash an issuer must hold, but how each agency treats bank deposits. Under the OCC rule, at least 5% of reserves must be held in demand deposits or similar balances. That is a direct requirement to hold bank money. The Fed proposal has no deposit floor. Instead, it would charge 2% capital against reserves held as uninsured deposits at an insured bank, and the same charge applies to undercollateralized reverse repo. One agency requires a minimum amount in deposits, and the other makes issuers hold extra capital against the deposits they choose to keep. Concentration works the same way. An issuer with 60% of its deposit reserves at one bank would breach the OCC's 40% cap, unless one of the custodian or government exemptions applies. Under the Fed's current text, that issuer would face only a judgment by its supervisor about whether it has managed concentration risk properly. The rules for a reserve shortfall also differ: OCC: the issuer must stop issuing immediately, and must start liquidating reserves only if the gap lasts 15 consecutive business days. Fed (proposed): the issuer must notify the Board within 24 hours and file a remediation plan, and liquidation must start by the end of the business day after the plan is filed unless backing has been restored. Capital Is Where The Gap Widens The difference is largest on capital. The OCC sets an individualized capital requirement measured in GAAP tangible equity. It has a $5 million floor that now lasts for the issuer's whole life, plus an operational backstop equal to 12 months of total expenses, up to half of which can be funded with qualifying subordinated debt. The Fed proposes a fixed formula. On top of the 2% charges on deposits and repo, it adds an operational-risk charge on outstanding issuance: 2% on the first $20 billion 1.5% on the next $30 billion 1% on anything above $50 billion It also adds 25% of three-year average revenue from sources other than reserves, adjusted by a loss scalar. For an issuer with $50 billion in circulation, the issuance charge alone works out to $850 million under the Fed's proposal, before the revenue add-on. The OCC rule has no comparable fixed figure. Its capital depends on the issuer's own risk profile, with the $5 million floor as the only set minimum. What Issuers Can Do Before November 30 For now, the OCC's figures are final and the Fed's are not. Issuers and banks that hold reserves can still argue for changes until the Fed's comment period closes on November 30, and the Fed has asked 277 questions. The decisions that matter most are clear from the comparison above: Deposits: whether the Fed adds a cash floor like the OCC's or keeps charging capital against uninsured deposits. Concentration: whether its principles-based approach gains a numerical cap. Capital: whether its standardized formula survives against the OCC's individualized approach. Both sets of rules apply from the same date, January 18, 2027. If the Fed's final rule keeps its current approach, the United States will begin regulating stablecoins with a common redemption deadline and two different reserve rulebooks, decided by which agency charters the issuer. Disclosure: This is not trading or investment advice. Always do your research before buying any cryptocurrency or investing in any services. Follow us on X @nulltxnews
